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San Francisco's Checkout Bag Fee Ordinance
and the Problem of Proposition 26
by NICOLE MISHA GOODWIN*
Introduction
In February of 2012, the San Francisco Board of Supervisors
enacted the county's Checkout Bag Ordinance. Designed to
decrease the use of disposable checkout bags and mitigate their
harmful environmental effects, the ordinance requires all retailers to
charge ten cents per paper or reusable checkout bag distributed to
their customers.2 Fifteen months later, the California electorate
passed Proposition 26 with fifty-two percent of the vote; the
proposition added a definition of a "tax" to the California
Constitution in order to recategorize certain regulatory fees.' On its
face, the amendment may seem like a semantic alteration to the
state's constitution. But the effect of such a reclassification will
undoubtedly affect state and local governments' ability to impose
certain regulatory fees without prior authorization by the electorate.
Many commentators regarded the Checkout Bag Ordinance as
codifying into law an environmental practice already observed by
many residents of the County.' Similar laws have been enacted in
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1. S.F., CAL., ENV'T CODE ch. 17, §§ 1702, 1703.5 (2012).
2. City and Cnty. of San Francisco, Green Initiative: City's Expanded Checkout Bag
Ordinance Takes Effect (Oct. 4, 2012), http://www5.sfgov.org/sf-news/2012/10/green-
initiative-citys-expanded-checkout-bag-ordinance-takes-effect.html.
3. CAL. SEC'Y OF STATE, OFFICIAL DECLARATION OF THE VOTE RESULTS ON
NOVEMBER 2,2010, STATE BALLOT MEASURES (2010), available at http://www.sos.ca.gov
/elections/sov/2010-general/07-for-against.pdf.




seventy-five other communities throughout the State of California,
and the habit of charging for carryout bags has been the norm across
Europe for years.! However, because the environmental enactment
never received prior voter approval, Proposition 26 may render it
unconstitutional.
I. Legal Foundation of Proposition 26
A. Construction of Voter Initiatives
Constitutional provisions enacted by voter initiative are applied
under the same principles governing statutory construction. In order
to ascertain and effectuate the intended purpose of the law, a court
will regard the ordinary meaning of the initiative's language as the
best indication of the voting public's intent.' If the proposition's plain
meaning using the words' ordinary meanings will not result in
irrational application, the court will presume the plain meaning of the
constitutional provision reflects the voters' intent.9 However, if the
proposition's words are ambiguous, the court will look to extrinsic
evidence to elucidate the language's intended meaning.o
B. Pre-Sinclair Paint Voter Initiatives and Resulting Constitutional
Authority
Historically, legislatures imposed fees that were either regulatory
or service related in nature. Authority for state and local
governments to impose regulatory fees derived from their police
power, which is a government's inherent authority to make laws
regulating otherwise lawful conduct in order to support the general
welfare." Authorizing statutes defined regulatory fees partially in the
negative, as "a monetary exaction other than a tax or special
assessment" that is charged to a person carrying on in an activity for
the purpose of defraying the social cost of that activity.12 For such a
5. Id.; San Francisco Dep't of the Env't, Checkout Bag Ordinance, SF
ENVIRONMENT (Aug. 28, 2013), http://www.sfenvironment.orglarticle/prevent-waste/chec
kout-bag-ordinance.
6. Finz, supra note 4.
7. Prof'1 Eng'rs in Cal. Gov't v. Kempton, 155 P.3d 226, 239 (Cal. 2007).
8. Id. at 239, 241 (citing People v. Rizo, 22 Cal. 4th 681, 685 (2000)).
9. Id. at 239.
10. Id.
11. U.S. CONST. amend. X; CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 7; Cnty. of Plumas v. Wheeler, 87
P. 909, 911 (1906) (quoting in part Ex parte Whitwell, 32 P. 870 (1893)).
12. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 66000(b) (2007) (emphasis added).
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regulatory fee to be lawful, the agency levying the fee must (1)
identify the purpose of the fee;" (2) demonstrate a reasonable
relationship between the fee's use and its purported purpose;14 (3)
demonstrate a reasonable relationship between the need for the fee's
use and the activity upon which the fee is imposed;" and (4) show that
the fee is charged at a reasonable rate." However, these fees need
not be imposed at a uniform rate."
As opposed to regulatory fees, service fees are exactions charged
to defray the governmental cost of providing a specific service to the
public." Though authority to levy service fees can similarly be
grounded in the police power, they are more often validated as
inherent in the ability to guarantee the service, or as incidental to the
privilege of enjoying the service."
In 1978, California voters adopted Proposition 13, which added
article XIII A to the California Constitution and generally (1) limited
the rate of ad velorum taxes on real property, and the frequency of
assessments on the value thereof; (2) required that "any changes in
state taxes enacted for the purpose of increasing revenues collected
pursuant thereto whether by increased rates or changes in method of
computation" must be approved by two-thirds of the legislature; and
(3) required two-thirds voter approval of special taxes imposed by
cities and counties. 20 For purposes of Proposition 13, an ad velorurn
tax is determined based on the value of the real property on which
the charge is levied.2' A special tax, alternatively, is one that is
imposed for a defined and specified use.22 In response to City and
County of San Francisco v. Farrell, which held that the special tax
limitation imposed by Proposition 13 does not encompass taxes
13. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 66001(a) (2007).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Durant v. City of Beverly Hills, 39 Cal. App. 2d 133, 138 (1940).
17. Id.
18. LEAGUE OF CAL. CITIES, PROPOSITION 26 IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE (2011),
available at www.cacities.org/Prop26Guide [hereinafter PROPOSITION 26
IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE].
19. Carlton Santee Corp. v. Padre Dam Mun. Water Dist., 120 Cal. App. 3d 14, 26
(1981); PROPOSITION 26 IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE, supra note 18, at 2 (citing Durant, 39
Cal. App. 2d at 137).
20. Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equal'n, 22 Cal. 3d
208,218 (1978) (quoting in part CAL. CONST. art. XIII A, § 3 (amended 2010)).
21. CAL. CONST. art. XIII A, § 1.
22. City and Cnty. of San Francisco v. Farrell, 32 Cal. 3d 47,57 (1982).
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imposed for a general governmental purpose, California voters
passed Proposition 62 in 1986.23 The ballot measure established a
simple majority voter approval requirement for general taxes in all
California general law cities and counties.24
In an effort to further close any loopholes in Proposition 13 and
clarify the applicability of Proposition 62, California voters enacted
Proposition 218 in 1996.2 Proposition 218 added articles XIII C and
XIII D to the California Constitution, which (1) require simple
majority voter approval for general taxes in general law cities, charter
cities, and counties, and (2) expand the definition of "special tax" to
include any tax levied for a specific purpose, even if the moneys were
placed in the government's general fund.26 However, a special tax still
does not include "any fee which does not exceed the reasonable cost
of providing the service or regulatory activity for which the fee is
charged, and which is not levied for general revenue purposes." 27
C. Sinclair Paint Co. v. State Board of Equalization
In Sinclair Paint Co. v. State Board of Equalization,28 the
California Supreme Court held that a regulatory fee imposed on
manufacturers or persons contributing to lead contamination was not
a tax, and therefore not subject to Proposition 13's two-thirds voter
29
approval requirement. In 1991, the California Legislature enacted
the Childhood Lead Poisoning Prevention Act by a simple majority
vote.3" The Act provided children, who were potential victims of lead
23. Id.; CAL. ENVTL. RES. EVALUATION SYSTEM, A PLANNER'S GUIDE TO
FINANCING PUBLIC IMPROVEMENTS (1997), available at http://ceres.ca.gov/planning/
financing/chapl.html.
24. See CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 53720, 53723 (2013). A general law city is any city that
has not adopted a charter. In effect, this means that the general law city is bound by
California state law, regardless of whether the subject matter concerns a municipal affair.
See LEAGUE OF CAL. CITIES, CHARTER CITIES: A QUICK SUMMARY FOR THE PRESS
AND RESEARCHERS (2007), available at http://www.cacities.org/UploadedFiles /League
Internet/03/0384277b-0el5-4421-b252-052b3f5c5dcc.pdf.
25. CAL. LEGIS. ANALYST'S OFFICE, UNDERSTANDING PROPOSITION 218 (1996),
available at http://www.lao.ca.gov/1996/120196_prop_218/understanding-prop2l8 _1296.pdf
[hereinafter UNDERSTANDING PROPOSITION 218].
26. Id. at 31-33. In general, the voter approval requirement expands the statutory
obligation on cities and counties established by Proposition 26, which excluded charter
cities such as Los Angeles and San Francisco.
27. CAL. GOv'T CODE § 50076 (2013).
28. Sinclair Paint Company v. State Bd. of Equalization, 15 Cal. 4th 866 (1997).
29. Id. at 870-73.
30. Id. at 869.
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poisoning, with evaluation, screening, and other related medically
necessary services.31 These programs were supported entirely by fees
assessed "on manufactures and other persons contributing to
environmental lead contamination."32 Fees were imposed on
identifiable sources of lead contamination, and were assessed in
accordance with the source's market share responsibility of
contamination."
Plaintiff Sinclair Paint Company ("Sinclair") challenged the fee,
claiming the Act was per se invalid because the charge was a tax,
rather than a fee.34 Defendant Board of Equalization contended that
the Act imposed a regulatory fee, rather than a tax.35 The question
was whether the charge imposed by the Act is a tax under article XIII
A, section 3 of the California Constitution or a fee that should be
excepted from the two thirds-voter approval requirement.6
There are three general categories of fees or assessments that
may not be subject to the constraints of Proposition 13: (1) special
assessments, which are based on the value of benefits conferred on
the property; (2) development fees exacted in return for permits or
other governmental privileges; and (3) regulatory fees that are
imposed under the police power. Special assessments and
development fees are not taxes, so long as they are in an amount
reasonably reflecting the value of the benefit conferred-or in the
case of development fees, the privilege's probable cost to the
community.3 1
Sinclair argued that because the fees are not imposed to
reimburse the state for benefits or governmental privileges granted to
the manufacturers, the fees are neither special assessments nor
development fees.3 ' However, the court found that the charges
imposed by the Act were in fact regulatory fees, and therefore
excepted from the general definition of a tax under Proposition 13.'
A regulatory fee levied under the California Legislature's police
31. Id.
32. Id. at 870-72.
33. Id. at 872.
34. Id. at 870.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 873.
37. Id. at 874.
38. Id. at 874-75.
39. Id. at 875.
40. Id. at 881.
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power is not treated as a tax so long as the fee does not exceed the
reasonable cost of providing services necessary to a regulation and is
not levied for an unrelated revenue raising purpose.4 1 There need not
be any benefit conferred on the fee payor, so long as the fee is only
42levied in the amount necessary to carry out the regulation's purpose.
The Act's fee provision qualified as a regulatory fee because it is
an effect-mitigating measure meant to defray the actual or anticipated
adverse effects of the payor's business operations.4 3 Thus, the Sinclair
court held that statutes requiring polluters or producers of
contaminants to pay for mitigation and cleanup efforts are regulatory
in nature." By imposing fees of this nature, the Legislature is trying
to regulate future behavior through deterrence, and the police power
encompasses the ability to regulate past, present, and future
behavior.45 As opposed to a fee enacted for a privilege, service, or
permit, a "regulatory program is for the protection of the health and
safety of the public.""
The court adopted the test set out in San Diego Gas & Electric
Co. v. San Diego County Air Pollution Control District for regulatory
fees.47 Under this test, the court held that a fee is a regulatory fee,
rather than a tax, if the government can show (1) the estimated costs
of the regulatory activity; and (2) that the costs are apportioned so
that the payor's burden bears a fair and reasonable relationship to
their burden on the regulatory activity." However, if the primary
purpose of a measure is to raise revenue and its regulatory effect is
only incidental, then the imposition is a tax.49 The court in Sinclair
held that regulating lead contaminators, rather than raising revenue,
was the primary purpose of the Act; the fact that the fee resulted in
revenue for the state was irrelevant.50
41. Id. at 876 (citing Pennell v. City of San Jose, 42 Cal. 3d 365, 375 (1986)).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 877.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 877-78.
46. Cal. Ass'n of Prof I Scientists v. Dep't of Fish & Game, 79 Cal. App. 4th 935, 950
(2000).
47. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Diego Cnty. Air Pollution Control Dist., 203
Cal. App. 3d 1132 (1988).
48. Id. at 1146.
49. Sinclair Paint Co., 15 Cal. 4th at 880.
50. Id. at 881.
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D. Proposition 26: Defining a "Tax"
In response to these "effect-mitigating regulatory fees," the
drafters of Proposition 26 intended to reclassify many of these fees
designed to mitigate adverse health, environmental, and societal
effects as taxes." As taxes, these charges will be subject to the voter
approval requirements of article XIII C." Proposition 26 overturned
the Sinclair decision by expanding article XIII C to the California
Constitution to define a tax as:
[A]ny levy, charge, or exaction of any kind imposed by
a local government, except the following:
(1) A charge imposed for a specific benefit conferred
or privilege granted directly to the payor that is not
provided to those not charged, and which does not
exceed the reasonable costs to the local government of
conferring the benefit or granting the privilege.
(2) A charge imposed for a specific government
service or product provided directly to the payor that
is not provided to those not charged, and which does
not exceed the reasonable costs to the local
government of providing the service or product.
(3) A charge imposed for the reasonable regulatory
costs to a local government for issuing licenses and
permits, performing investigations, inspections, and
audits, enforcing agricultural marketing orders, and
the administrative enforcement and adjudication
thereof.
(4) A charge imposed for entrance to or use of local
government property, or the purchase, rental, or lease
of local government property.
(5) A fine, penalty, or other monetary charge imposed
by the judicial branch of government or a local
government, as a result of a violation of law.
51. PROPOSITION 26 IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE, supra note 18, at 3.
52. Id.
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(6) A charge imposed as a condition of property
development.
(7) Assessments and property-related fees imposed in
accordance with the provisions of Article XIII D."
Before the passage of Proposition 26, the definitions of "general
tax" and "special tax" provided by Proposition 218 did not directly
define what a "tax" was.' Instead, taxes were described in the
negative." As of November 2010, when Proposition 26 became
effective, all charges, levies, or exactions enacted by local government
must be subject to voter approval unless it fits within one of the seven
exceptions listed above.
This definition of a tax invalidates impermissible revenue raising
exactions, as well as the acceptable regulatory fees under Sinclair."
Under the pre-Proposition 26 regime, a benefit need not be conferred
upon the payor of a fee, so long as the fee was reasonable and levied
to further a legitimate regulatory interest.58  Under the current
system, any source of revenue for local government must be treated
as a tax unless it falls within one of the seven exceptions."
II. San Francisco Environmental Code Chapter 17 and the
Upshot of Proposition 26
A. The Plastic Bag Ban and Checkout Bag Charge Amendment
In March of 2007, the San Francisco Board of Supervisors voted
to pass Ordinance number 80-71, known as the Plastic Bag Reduction
Ordinance, which amended the San Francisco Environmental Code
by adding Chapter 17, sections 1701 through 1709.6 The effects of
these amendments were to (1) require the use of compostable plastic,
53. CAL. CONST. art. XIII C, § 1(e).
54. UNDERSTANDING PROPOSITION 218, supra note 25, at 42-43.
55. PROPOSITION 26 IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE, supra note 18, at 4-5. See also CAL.
Gov. CODE § 50076 (2013) (explaining, for example, that a fee is not a tax so long as it
does not exceed the reasonable cost of providing a service).
56. See CAL. CONST. art. XIII C, § 1(e).
57. Sinclair Paint Company v. State Bd. of Equalization, 15 Cal. 4th 866 , 880 (1997).
5& Id. at 876; San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Diego Cnty. Air Pollution Control
Dist., 203 Cal. App. 3d 1132, 1146 (1988).
59. CAL. CONST. art. XIII C, § 1(e); PROPOSITION 26 IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE,
supra note 18, at 6 (discussing definition of "levy, charge, or exaction").
60. S.F., CAL., ENV'T CODE ch. 17, H§ 1701-09 (2007).
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recyclable paper, and/or reusable checkout bags by grocery stores
located in the City and County of San Francisco; and (2) provide
penalties for violations. The ordinance was meant to lessen the
environmental impact of disposable bags by reducing litter, waste,
pollution, and contamination in recycling and composting programs."
By February 2012, San Francisco enacted its Checkout Bag
Ordinance, which amended section 1702 and added section 1703.5 to
the San Francisco Environmental Code.62 The ordinance extended
the plastic bag restriction from supermarkets and pharmacies to all
retail stores, 6 and established a ten-cent charge for each checkout bag
provided to customers." The Proposition 26 tax analysis applies to
the Ordinance because it requires consumers to pay for the use of
checkout bags at all retail stores.
B. The Retroactivity Question
Since Chapter 17 was added to the San Francisco Environmental
Code in 2007, three years before Proposition 26 came into effect, the
issue of retroactive application must be addressed. An initiative will
not be applied retroactively unless the measure expressly includes a
retroactivity provision, or "it is very clear from extrinsic sources that
the Legislature or the voters must have intended retroactive
application."" Though Proposition 26 contains an express
retroactivity clause regarding state measures, no such provision exists
as to local charges." However, materials issued by the Legislative
Analyst's Office prior to the passage of Proposition 26 stated that fees
or charges in existence prior to the November 2010 election will not
be affected unless "the state or local government later increases or
extends the fees or charges."6
61. San Francisco Dep't of the Env't, supra note 5.
62. S.F., CAL., ENV'T CODE ch. 17, §§ 1702,1703.5 (2007).
63. S.F., CAL., ENV'T CODE ch. 17, § 1702 (2007).
64. S.F., CAL., ENV'T CODE ch. 17, § 1703.5 (2007).
65. See CAL. TAXPAYERS ASS'N, UNDERSTANDING PROPOSITION 26 5-6 (Aug. 15,
2011), available at http://www.caltax.org/UnderstandingProposition26.pdf [hereinafter
UNDERSTANDING PROPOSITION 26].
66. Strauss v. Horton, 46 Cal. 4th 364, 470 (2009) (citing Evangelatos v. Super. Ct., 44
Cal. 3d 1188, 1209 (1988)).
67. Compare CAL. CONST. art. XIII A, § 3(c), with CAL. CONST. art. XIII C, § 1.
68. CAL. LEGIS. ANALYST'S OFFICE, PROPOSITION 26 BALLOT PAMPHLET 5-6
(June 15, 2010), available at http://www.1ao.ca.gov/ballot/2010/26-11_2010.pdf [hereinafter
PROPOSITION 26 BALLOT PAMPHLET].
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There seem to be two plausible ways to frame the Checkout Bag
Ordinance with regard to the question of retroactivity: (1) as a new
fee or charge that came into effect when the Ordinance was enacted
in 2012; or (2) as an amendment to the existing Chapter 17 of the San
Francisco Environmental Code. Under either interpretation, the
charge will come within the purview of Proposition 26. If the fee is
characterized as a new exaction that came into effect when the
Ordinance was enacted, then it clearly falls under the scope of
Proposition 26 as a "tax ... [that must be] submitted to the electorate
and approved" by a majority or two-thirds vote." If the charge
applied as an amendment to the existing law, rather than a new
imposition, it would still be subject to article XIII C, section 2 of the
California Constitution voter approval requirements as a charge
increase or extension implemented after the Proposition's passage.70
Since the Checkout Bag Ordinance was enacted such that it comes
within the intended scope of Proposition 26, it must be analyzed
under articles XIII A and XIII C of the California Constitution.
C. Analyzing a Levy, Charge, or Exaction under Proposition 26
Analyzing a levy, charge, or exaction imposed by local
government implicates a multi-step "tax test."" But because
Proposition 26 defines a tax as any "levy, charge, or exaction," a fee
must qualify as one of those three before being reclassified as a tax.'
There appears to be no meaningful difference among the terms
levy, charge, and exaction. Although the first six exceptions provided
in article XIII C, section 1, reference the word "charge"-and the
seventh exception uses the terms "[a]ssessments" and "property-
related fees"-article XIII C does not explicitly define any of these
three terms.7 ' However, article XIII D, adopted by Proposition 218,
defines "fee" or "charge," but not "levy" or "exaction." 74  The
California Supreme Court explained that contrary to the canons of
constitutional construction, the two defined terms were not intended
to be distinguished:
69. CAL. CONST. art. XIII C, § 2(b); see CAL. CONST. art. XIII C, § 2(d). Whether
the charge is subject to simple majority or two-thirds approval depends on whether it is
classified as a general or special tax, respectively.
70. PROPOSITION 26 BALLOT PAMPHLET, supra note 68, at 5-6.
71. UNDERSTANDING PROPOSITION 26, supra note 65, at 6.
72. CAL. CONST. art. XIII C, § 1(e).
73. See id.
74. See CAL. CONST. art. XIII D, § 2(e).
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Because article XIII D provides a single
definition that includes both "fee" and "charge," those
terms appear to be synonymous in both article XIII D
and article XIII C. This is an exception to the normal
rule of construction that each word in a constitutional
or statutory provision is assumed to have independent
significance. We use the terms interchangeably... ."
In light of the gloss that the California Supreme Court has placed
over articles XIII C and XIII D of California's Constitution, it can
reasonably be inferred that levy, charge, and exaction should also
receive the same synonymous interpretation. The phrase "levy,
charge, or exaction of any kind" is likely intended by the Legislature
to be interpreted expansively to include all sources of revenue
"imposed by a local government" under article XIII C, section 1."
Once a prospective tax is characterized as a levy, charge or
exaction, it may be analyzed under Proposition 26's multi-step
framework, summarized in the chart below:"
75. Bighorn-Desert View Water Agency v. Verjil, 39 Cal. 4th 205, 225 n.4 (2006)
(citation omitted).
76. CAL. CONST. art. XIII C, § 1(e); PROPOSITION 26 IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE,
supra note 18, at 10.
77. See UNDERSTANDING PROPOSITION 26, supra note 65, at 6; see also
PROPOSITION 26 IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE, supra note 18, at 10.
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D. Analyzing the Checkout Bag Fee Ordinance Under Proposition 26
Using the Proposition 26 framework to analyze San Francisco's
checkout bag fee raises several legal questions with regard to the
charge's classification as a fee or a tax. First, in determining whether
the checkout bag charge must be treated as a tax or fee, this Note will
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analyze the Ordinance under the relevant exceptions laid out in
article XIII C, section 1, subdivision (e). The checkout bag fee
possibly implicates the exceptions in subdivision (e)(1) regarding fees
for benefits and privileges conferred, and subdivision (e)(3)
concerning fees for permit and inspection fees. This Note will then
address whether the Ordinance includes a levy, charge, or exaction of
any kind. The answer to this question cannot be assumed; if the
checkout bag charge is not found to be a levy, charge, or exaction, the
law does not come within the scope of Proposition 26 and will not be
subject to voter approval. Though there are several conceivable
proposals that would involve a benefit assessment or property-related
charge-particularly those which will also fall within the exception
laid out in article XIII C, section 1, subdivision (e)(7)-the checkout
bag charge at issue here does not implicate Proposition 218.
Accordingly, this Note will not address that issue.
1. The Proposition 26 Burden of Proof
In its final paragraph, Proposition 26 provides:
The local government bears the burden of
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that a
levy, charge, or other exaction is not a tax, that the
amount is no more than necessary to cover the
reasonable costs of the governmental activity, and that
the manner in which those costs are allocated to a
payor bear a fair or reasonable relationship to the
payor's burdens on, or benefits received from, the
governmental activity. 9
This language imposes three distinct requirements upon the
government: (1) that the levy, charge, or exaction is not a tax;" (2)
that the amount is not more than necessary to reasonably cover the
cost of the activity;" and (3) that the manner in which the costs are
78. If the charge does not fit within one of the seven specified exceptions, then the
analysis continues to the final question of whether the revenue is to be placed in the
general fund or the special fund. However, if the analysis has reached this point, the
charge is a tax and the final inquiry is necessary only to determine what percentage of the
electorate is necessary to authorize its imposition.
79. CAL. CONST. art. XIII C, § 1(e).
80. Id. The government achieves this by showing that the levy, charge, or exaction
fits into one of the seven enumerated exceptions.
81. Id.
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allocated bears a fair or reasonable relationship to the payor's burden
on or benefits received from the activity."
In litigation, the government will bear the burden to justify the
fee." However, Proposition 26 only requires the government to
justify its revenue measures by a preponderance of the evidence,
which is the lowest evidentiary standard.' Thus, although the
government is saddled with the initial burden of proof, the
requirement is not so harsh that the evidentiary burden should pose
much of an issue during litigation.
2. The Section 1, Subdivision (e) (1) Exception for Fees for Benefits and
Privileges Conferred
Article XIII C, section 1, subdivision (e)(1) of the California
Constitution excludes from the definition of a tax:
A charge imposed for a specific benefit conferred
or privilege granted directly to the payor that is not
provided to those not charged, and which does not
exceed the reasonable costs to the local government of
conferring the benefit or granting the privilege.'
This exception imposes three requirements: (1) the charge must
be imposed for a specific benefit conferred or privilege granted; (2)
the benefit conferred or privilege granted must not be provided to
those not charged; and (3) the charge must not exceed the local
agency's reasonable costs.'
If this second criterion is to be read literally, the language of
Proposition 26 could require that no person "can be charged for a
benefit or privilege if any other person receives it for free."'
However, the "Findings and Declarations of Purpose" of Proposition
26 suggests otherwise.' The initiative was directed at preventing new
taxes from being disguised as fees "in order to extract even more
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ & GEORGE C. PRATr, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION JURY
INSTRUCTIONS § 2.02(B) (2d ed. 2013) (stating that a jury can make a finding by a
preponderance of the evidence "when it is shown that the fact is more likely true than not
true"); PROPOSITION 26 IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE, supra note 18, at 45.
85. CAL. CONST. art. XIII C, § i1(e)(1) (emphasis added).
86. PROPOSITION 26 IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE, supra note 18, at 15.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 15-16.
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revenue from California taxpayers without having to abide by ...
constitutional voting requirements."" Well-settled case law also
suggests that a literal reading of the second requirement may not be
appropriate." Historically, when regulatory fees that involve excess
charges are used to help subsidize discounts to other fee payors, they
are deemed to be taxes.9' Consequently, this first exception excludes
from treatment as a tax a fee that covers the total cost of providing a
benefit or privilege to the fee payors, so long as the charge does not
also include a subsidy to provide free or discounted services to
others.'
By characterizing the retail store that is effectuating the checkout
bag charge as an agent of the City, the payment arguably fits into the
tax exception detailed in article XIII C, section 1, subdivision (e)(1).
The exclusion provides a charge is not a tax if it is "imposed for a
specific benefit conferred or privilege granted directly to the payor
that is not provided to those not charged."93 Here, the benefit or
privilege conferred by the County to the payor of the charge is the
right to purchase and use paper bags at the point of sale.'
Characterizing the right to purchase paper bags upon checkout from a
retail store as a benefit or privilege is particularly convincing when
considering that the County can ban paper checkout bags at any
time." Additionally, the exception requires that the charge "does not
exceed the reasonable costs to the local government of conferring the
benefit or granting the privilege."96 Research conducted by the Los
Angeles Department of Public Works indicated that the ten-cent
charge is close to the actual average cost of providing the paper bag.'
89. UNDERSTANDING PROPOSITION 26, supra note 65, at 14-15.
90. PROPOSITION 26 IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE, supra note 18, at 15-16.
91. Id.; see, e.g., CAL. Gov'T CODE § 50076 (1979) (A "special tax [subject to the
two-thirds voter approval requirement of Prop. 13 Art. XIII A, § 4] shall not include any
fee which does not exceed the reasonable cost of providing the service or regulatory
activity for which the fee is charged and which is not levied for general revenue
purposes.").
92. PROPOSITION 26 IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE, supra note 18, at 16.
93. CAL. CONST. art. XIII C, § 1(e)(1).
94. See Schmeer v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 213 Cal. App. 4th 1310, 1315 (2013).
95. See S.F., CAL., ENV'T CODE ch. 17, §§ 1701-09 (2007) (establishing the San
Francisco plastic checkout bag ban).
96. CAL. CONST. art. XIII C, § 1(e)(1).
97. L.A. DEP'T OF PUB. WORKS, AN OVERVIEW OF CARRYOUT BAGS IN LOS
ANGELES COUNTY 36 (Aug. 2007), available at http://ladpw.org/epd/pdf/ PlasticBag
Report.pdf. The department's research also revealed that retailers budget for the cost of
purchasing single use carryout bags, and if they are required to charge for the use of these
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One problem, however, is that a court could classify the charge
as a fee rather than a tax. For example, the exception requires that
the charge "not exceed the reasonable costs to the local government
of conferring the benefit or granting the privilege."" If the charge
cannot exceed the cost to the government conferring the benefit or
privilege, one can reasonably infer that the government itself must
grant the benefit or privilege. Here, the government is not granting
any benefit; it is the retail establishment that is providing the privilege
of purchasing a checkout bag at the point of sale to the payor." Nor
does it cost San Francisco any money to provide customers with a
checkout bag. On its face, the Checkout Bag Ordinance does not
satisfy two of the three requirements of the (e)(1) exception. First,
the ten-cent charge is not imposed for a specific privilege conferred
by the County. Second, the charge exceeds the County's reasonable
cost of providing the benefit (which, in this case, is nothing)."o
Even if the retail establishment is regarded as an agent of the
County, and therefore the County is providing the checkout bags, a
legitimate question still exists as to whether offering the bags is a
benefit or privilege. Prior to the Ordinance, customers had an
undisputed right to receive paper bags from retailers at the point of
sale.'0 ' The goal of the (e)(1) exception is to defray the cost to local
government of providing a benefit or privilege to its constituency.102
However, even if the store is acting as the County's agent, the cost to
the local government is still nonexistent and the retailer wholly
retains the ten-cent charge.' 03 The fact that the County could have
bags, all consumers may end up paying less for goods purchased from the retailer.
Because this benefit would extend to those who do not purchase a carryout bag,
presumably because they bring their own, it may initially seem that the charge fails the
second requirement of the exception (that the benefit conferred or privilege granted must
not be provided to those not charged). However, as previously discussed, this language
should not be read literally, but rather as requiring that the charge does not include a
subsidy to provide free or discounted services to others. Since these consumers who are
not paying the ten-cent fee are not receiving checkout bags (the benefit) at a discounted
price, the fact that there is an incidental benefit to all consumers should not prevent the
charge from falling within the scope of this Proposition 26 exclusion.
98. CAL. CONST. art. XIII C, § 1(e)(1).
99. See Schmeer, 213 Cal. App. 4th at 1327.
100. See CAL. CONST. art. XIII C, § 1(e)(1); see also supra note 97 (discussing the
benefit conferred to non-payors).
101. See S.F., CAL., ENV'T CODE ch. 17, §§ 1701-09 (2007).
102. PROPOSITION 26 IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE, supra note 18, at 16.
103. Richard Doyle, Memorandum Single Use Carryout Bag Charge, SAN JOSE CITY
ATTORNEY 2-3 (Dec. 2, 2010), available at http://www3.sanjoseca.gov/clerk/Agenda
/20101214/20101214_0702.pdf.
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outlawed the sale of paper carryout bags but failed to do so is likely
not sufficient to characterize selling bags as a benefit or privilege.
Proposition 26 should be construed to limit government's imposition
of taxes and fees.14 To characterize the County's failure to ban paper
bags-rather than affirmatively providing them for sale when they
were not before-as a benefit or privilege seems illogical in light of
the initiative's purported purpose. As a matter of common sense, the
privilege or benefit granted should be an affirmative act of the
government to provide something that was not previously conferred
or available.' To construe government's inaction as fitting within the
scope of the (e)(1) exception to Proposition 26's definition of a tax
would be to expand the County's ability to impose a tax or fee
without voter approval. This interpretation seems inconsistent with
the intent of Proposition 26. 6
Both proponents and opponents of the Checkout Bag Ordinance
make valid legal arguments that fit within the (e)(1) exception to the
definition of a tax. Applicability of the exception rests on the first
and third elements, namely (1) whether the charge is imposed for a
specific benefit or privilege, and (3) whether the charge exceeds the
County's reasonable cost.107 While the third element seems, in part,
resolved by characterizing the retailer as an agent of the County, the
first element is problematic. Characterizing the government's
inaction as the County "providing a benefit to retail customers" is
contrary to the stated purpose of Proposition 26. In other words, the
purpose of Proposition 26 is to limit taxes chargeable by the
government that escape the requirement of electoral approval.' For
this reason, it seems unlikely that a court would interpret the (e)(1)
exception so broadly as to classify the Checkout Bag Ordinance as a
fee, rather than a tax.
104. PROPOSITION 26 IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE, supra note 18, at 3.
105. See Benefit, MERRIAM-WEBSTER (Apr. 7, 2013), http://www.merriam-webster
.com/dictionary/benefit (defining a benefit as "an act of kindness," "useful aid," and "a
service (as health insurance)"); Privilege, MERRIAM-WEBSTER (Apr. 7, 2013),
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/privilege (defining a privilege as "a right ...
granted as a peculiar benefit, advantage, or favor").
106. See PROPOSITION 26 IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE, supra note 18, at 3.
107. See CAL. CONST. art. XIII C, § 1(e)(1).
108. See PROPOSITION 26 IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE, supra note 18, at 3.
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3. The Section 1, Subdivision (e) (3) Exception for Permitting and
Inspection Fees
Article XIII C, section 1, subdivision (e)(3) of the California
Constitution excludes from the definition of a tax:
A charge imposed for the reasonable regulatory
costs to a local government for issuing licenses and
permits, performing investigations, inspections, and
audits, enforcing agricultural marketing orders, and
the administrative enforcement and adjudication
thereof."
This exception covers a range of local government regulatory
fees. The list of permitted regulatory costs is exhaustive, and includes
issuing permits and licenses, performing investigations and audits and
administrative enforcement and adjudication."o Like the exception in
subdivision (e)(1), fees within the scope of this exemption must be
determined in relation to the local government's reasonable cost."'
The courts will most likely determine the breadth of this
exception-while taking into account the fact that Proposition 26 is
the manifestation of dissatisfaction with Sinclair Paint Co. v. State
Board of Equalization.12 The court of appeal noted:
There is nothing on the face of the Act to show
the fees collected are used to regulate Sinclair.... The
Act does not require Sinclair to comply with any other
conditions; it merely requires Sinclair to pay what the
Department determines to be its share of the program
cost."'
The California Supreme Court, however, held that simply
because the fee was not part of the regulatory program, this did not
preclude the state from requiring Sinclair to help mitigate its
109. CAL. CONST. art. XIII C, § 1(e)(3).
110. Id.; PROPOSITION 26 IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE, supra note 18, at 29 (asserting
that the list of acceptable regulatory costs is "a closed list," since it does not include
language like "including" or "such as" preceding the list of permitted regulatory costs).
111. See CAL. CONST. art. XIII C, § 1(e)(3).
112. PROPOSITION 26 IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE, supra note 18, at 30-31.
113. Sinclair Paint Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 44 Cal. App. 4th 1434 (1996),
vacated, 15 Cal. 4th 866 (1997).
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operation's impact on childhood lead poisoning.114 In light of the
Sinclair court's decision and the voters' response in approving
Proposition 26, a local agency should ask the following questions to
determine whether a fee comes within the scope of the subdivision
(e)(3) exception:
1. Is the fee payor regulated?
2. If so, what is the regulatory program?
3. Does the program involve the issuance of a license
or permit or authorize or require an investigation,
inspection or audit?"'
The Checkout Bag Ordinance seems to satisfy the first two
elements of this exception. Here, the fee could be characterized as
regulating the payor by mitigating the effects that customers' use of
checkout bags has on the County's landfill."6 However, it is difficult
to conceive how the Ordinance-which requires retailers to charge
ten-cents per carryout bag-involves "issuing licenses and permits,
performing investigations, inspections, and audits, enforcing
agricultural marketing orders, and the administrative enforcement
and adjudication thereof."" In the Proposition 26 Implementation
Guide, the drafters set forth examples that would satisfy the (e)(3)
exception, such as imposing a licensing fee on businesses that sell
alcohol, or establishing regulations requiring parking lot operators to
comply with "best management practices.""' Unlike the checkout
bag fee, these projects involve government permission or
administrative enforcement in exchange for the fee."9 With the ten-
cent checkout bag charge, however, the fee is the program's end,
rather than the means to achieve a regulatory or administrative goal.
Proposition 26's proponents' "Findings and Declarations of
Purpose" states that "Proposition 26 preserves [environmental and
consumer protection] laws and protects legitimate fees such as those
to clean up environmental or ocean damage, fund necessary
consumer regulations, or punish wrongdoing, and for licenses for
114. Sinclair Paint Co., 15 Cal. 4th at 877.
115. PROPOSITION 26 IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE, supra note 18, at 31. See also CAL.
CONST. art. XIII C, § 1(e)(3).
116. PROPOSITION 26 IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE, supra note 18, at 31.
117. CAL. CONST. art. XIII C, § 1(e)(3).
118. PROPOSITION 26 IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE, supra note 18, at 31.
119. See id. at 32.
Fall 20131 SAN FRANCISCO'S CHECKOUT BAG FEE 169
professional certification or driving." 120 Though this statement might
suggest that voters did not intend Proposition 26 to require electoral
approval of environmental fees and charges, it is difficult to construe
this exception as encompassing the San Francisco Checkout Bag
Ordinance. The initiative was expressly passed in response to the
court's allowance of a similar environmental mitigation fee in Sinclair
Paint Co.12' Further, ballot arguments such as the Proposition 26
"Findings and Declarations of Purpose" can only be used as an
extrinsic aid for courts to determine the voters' intent in adopting a
ballot initiative. 22 Since the voters' intent in approving Proposition 26
is clear, this statement contained in the ballot arguments is immaterial
in analyzing the checkout bag charge under the exception
enumerated in subdivision (e)(3).
Subdivision (e)(3) seems to be even less effective at saving the
San Francisco Checkout Bag Ordinance than the subdivision (e)(1)
exception. It is difficult to characterize the charge as involving a
license, permit, or the like because the ten-cent bag charge seems to
comprise the entire project. Though mitigation is presumably the
goal of the Ordinance, the (e)(3) exception appears directed at
exempting from the definition of a tax any fee that must be levied in
order to defray the cost of administrative enforcement. That element
is clearly lacking here.
4. The "Levy, Charge, or Exaction" Exemption
The final, and most convincing argument, for the Checkout Bag
Ordinance to avoid being classified as a tax is that the charge should
not be considered a levy, charge, or exaction, and thus fails the initial
inquiry of the Proposition 26 analysis.'23 In Schmeer v. County of Los
Angeles, the court held that an ordinance similar to the San Francisco
checkout bag fee was a fee and not subject to voter approval because
the ten-cent charge was retained by the store, and therefore should
not be characterized as a tax.'24 The ordinary meaning of the word
"tax" refers to a "compulsory payment made to the government or
120. UNDERSTANDING PROPOSITION 26, supra note 65, at 18.
121. Sinclair Paint Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 15 Cal. 4th 866, 870 (1997);
PROPOSITION 26 IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE, supra note 18, at 30-31.
122. Calif's for Political Reform Found. v. Fair Political Practices Comm'n, 61 Cal.
App. 4th 472, 485 (1998) (citing Mobilepark W. Homeowners Ass'n v. Escondido
Mobilepark W., 35 Cal. App. 4th 32,42 n.6 (1995)).
123. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
124. Schmeer v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 213 Cal. App. 4th 1310, 1329 (2013).
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remitted to the government in order to raise revenue."" Though
article XIII C,-section 1, subdivision (e) of the California Constitution
does not state that a levy, charge, or exaction must be payable to the
charging government, it does require that the tax be "imposed by a
local government."" 6 Because of the plain meaning of the term "tax,"
coupled with the explicit language of article XIII C, section 1,
subdivision (e), the Schmeer court concluded that Proposition 26 is
ambiguous as to whether the charge must be payable to the
government in order to be characterized as a tax.27
The exceptions listed in article XIII C, section 1, subdivision (e)
"all relate to charges ordinarily payable to the government, including
charges imposed in connection with governmental activities or use of
government property, fines imposed by the government for a
violation of law, development fees and real property assessments."128
The first three exceptions listed, as well as the final paragraph
discussing the government's burden of proof, require that the charge
not exceed the "reasonable costs to the local government" of the
benefit or service.'" These provisions, therefore, do not contemplate
a charge being excepted from the definition of a tax if it is paid to a
non-governmental entity or person where such entity or person is
incurring the program's cost." This suggests that the language, "levy,
charge, or exaction of any kind imposed," is limited to charges
payable directly to the government, and that this construction was
most consistent with the plain language meaning of the term "tax.",13
Neither the text of Proposition 26, nor the ballot pamphlet
materials, suggests that the electorate intended the definition of a
"tax" to include charges payable to a private entity or person.132 The
California Legislative Analyst's Office stated, "the types of fees and
charges that would become taxes under the measure are ones that
government imposes to address health, environmental, or other
125. Id. at 1326; see also Cal. Farm Bureau Fed'n v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 51
Cal. 4th 421, 437 (2011) ("Ordinarily taxes are imposed for revenue purposes and not 'in
return for a specific benefit conferred or privilege grated."'); Sinclair Paint Co., 15 Cal. 4th
at 874 ("[Tjaxes are imposed for revenue purposes, rather than in return for a specific
benefit conferred or privilege granted.").
126. CAL. CONST. art. XIII C, § 1(e) (emphasis added).
127. Schmeer, 213 Cal. App. 4th at 1326-27.
128. Id. at 1327 (citing CAL. CONST. art. XIII C, § 1(e)).
129. CAL. CONST. art. XIII C, § 1(e).
130. Schmeer, 213 Cal. App. 4th at 1327.
131. Id. -
132. Id. at 1327-28.
Fall 20131 ' SAN FRANCISCO'S CHECKOUT BAG FEE 171
societal or economic concerns." 33 Examples provided of regulatory
fees that would be reclassified as taxes under Proposition 26 each
involved government use of funds for a specified purpose, implying
that applicable fees should be payable directly to the government.
The Legislative Analyst's Office's analysis does not discuss any fees
payable to a private person or entity, nor does it suggest that voters
intended Proposition 26 to impact such charges.'3  Based on its
statutory analysis, coupled with the ballot materials prepared by the
California Legislative Analyst's Office, the Schmeer court held that
"any levy, charge, or exaction of any kind imposed by a local
government ... is limited to charges payable to, or for the benefit of,
a local government."l 36
Perhaps the best argument against this reading of the "levy,
charge, or exaction" requirement of article XIII C, section 1,
subdivision (e) can be found in Washington v. Confederated Tribes of
Colville Indian Reservation.' In this case, several American Indian
tribes challenged the efforts of Washington State to tax various
activities occurring on the plaintiffs' reservations." The court
maintained, "taxes can be used for distributive or regulatory
purposes, as well as for raising revenue."'39 Once the revenue-raising
requirement is removed from the definition of a tax, the analysis
moves away from the logic detailed in Schmeer. Article XIII C,
section 1, subdivision (e) provides that a "'tax' means any levy,
charge, or exaction of any kind imposed by a local government."'
Nowhere in this introductory clause does it say the "levy, charge, or
exaction" must be collected by the government. 14' By employing the
word's ordinary meaning, a court may reasonably define a "tax" to
include any charge that is established by the government's authority,
133. California Legislative Analyst's Office, Proposition 26: Increases Legislative Vote
Requirement to Two-Thirds for State Levies and Charges. Imposes Additional Requirement
for Voters to Approve Local Levies and Charges With Limited Exceptions (July 15, 2010),
http://www.1ao.ca.gov/ballot/2010/26_11_2010.aspx.
134. Id.
135. Id.; see also Schmeer, 213 Cal. App. 4th at 1328.
136. Id. at 1328-29.
137. Wash. v. Confed. Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 477 U.S. 134 (1980).
138. Id. at 139.
139. Id. at 158.
140. CAL. CONST. art. XIII C, § 1(e) (emphasis added).
141. See CAL. CONST. art. XIII C, § 1(e).
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regardless of whether the government agency enjoys the resulting
revenue.142
Moreover, only three of the seven enumerated exceptions
mention the government's reasonable cost of providing the service or
benefit.143 Under the default rules of statutory and constitutional
construction, each word is assumed to have independent significance;
the fact that four of the provisions included in Proposition 26 make
no mention of compensating the government for the program's cost
suggests that it is only a requirement when specifically provided.'" If
courts employ this interpretation of Proposition 26's language, the
California Court of Appeal's decision in Schmeer will likely not save
the San Francisco Checkout Bag Ordinance from being characterized
as a tax.
Conclusion
Enacting the San Francisco Checkout Bag Ordinance was an
uncontroversial act by the County's Board of Supervisors. However,
the ambiguous and (mostly) unanalyzed language of Proposition 26
proves problematic for the ten-cent charge. Though none of the
seven enumerated exceptions seem to convincingly encompass the
Ordinance, the introductory clause may be the charge's savior. This
issue is currently working its way through the State of California's
court system. The ultimate question of whether Proposition 26
applies to the charge will likely'depend on the California Supreme
Court's interpretation of voter intent. The Court's interpretation of
whether the electorate intended to require voter approval of
environmental fees and charges will determine the success or failure
of the Ordinance.
This question, along with similar inquires, will persist as the long-
term impacts of Proposition 26 play out in California's Judiciary. The
initiative's ambiguous language undoubtedly opens the door for
courts to apply the constitutional provision expansively or narrowly,
the effect of which will determine California's state and local
governments' ability to impose regulatory fees without prior voter
approval.
142. See Impose, MERRIAM-WEBSTER (Apr. 6, 2013) http://www.merriam-webster.
com/dictionary/impose (defining impose as "establish[ing] or apply[ing] by authority"); see
also PROPOSITION 26 IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE, supra note 18, at 16 n.23.
143. CAL. CONST. art. XIII C, § 1(e).
144. See DuBois v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 5 Cal. 4th 382, 388 (1993).
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